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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
Europe without Britain 
Assessing the Impact on the European Union  
of a British Withdrawal 
A series of developments in both the UK and the EU 
have led to a situation where a referendum on the 
UK’s membership now looks increasingly likely. Most 
clearly, Prime Minister David Cameron has committed 
the Conservative Party, should it win the general elec-
tion due in 2015, to renegotiate Britain’s relationship. 
This would then be put to the British people in a refer-
endum, expected to be around 2017. Wider political 
pressure is mounting for other party leaders to make 
similar commitments. Recent opinion polling points 
to strong and growing support for withdrawal. While 
we should be careful not to assume the UK is destined 
to withdraw, the possibility of this happening is now 
stronger than ever before. 
A UK withdrawal would have profound implica-
tions and costs for the UK, far greater than for the EU. 
Nevertheless, the rest of the EU would face both the 
unprecedented event of a withdrawal of a member 
state and, in the case of the UK, the withdrawal of one 
of its largest members. This could bring about signifi-
cant changes to the EU. For some, the loss of one of 
the most economically liberal members could tip the 
EU towards protectionism, or perhaps trigger a crisis 
in European integration leading to the EU’s unravel-
ing. Others see the potential for the EU to free itself 
of its most awkward member, making the EU easier 
to lead, aiding a solution to the Eurozone’s crises, in 
turn strengthening the foundations for an ever closer 
union among the people of Europe. While there has 
been some discussion of the implications for the EU 
of agreeing to a renegotiated relationship for the UK 
within the EU, opinions about what a withdrawal 
would mean are quite few and far between and what 
exists has not been subject to any detailed analysis. 
Most analysis on a UK withdrawal focuses instead on 
the implications for the UK. As such, a potentially 
more dramatic and damaging event – potentially far 
more than a renegotiation – in the development of 
the EU is being under discussed. The threat of a with-
drawal also underpins David Cameron’s hopes to 
secure a renegotiation of Britain’s relationship within 
the EU. As such, there is a need for better analysis of 
the possible implications of a withdrawal. 
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6 
A British withdrawal would trigger three inter-
related series of challenges to the EU: 
First, there is the problem of how to manage the 
process of a British withdrawal. For a long time dis-
cussion of a member state withdrawing from the EU 
was something of a taboo. To a certain extent this 
remains so. Despite the inclusion of Article 50 in the 
Treaty on European Union, setting out a withdrawal 
process, the procedure is something of an unopened 
Pandora’s Box. Negotiations would not only take place 
between the UK and EU. Negotiations would need to 
take place within the EU to amend the EU’s institu-
tions, voting allocations, quotas and budgets; issues 
rarely settled with ease. 
The second problem is how to shape ongoing EU 
cooperation and integration around a British with-
drawal. The absence from the EU’s formal decision 
making structures of one of the largest and arguably 
one of its most influential member states, could 
change the balance of power within the EU, in turn 
changing its nature and direction. Numerous sce-
narios exist: some point towards an EU that is more 
inward looking; others towards an EU that is more 
easily led and therefore better able to deal with its 
internal and external problems. Here we should be 
careful not to overplay the part the UK plays in the 
EU’s problems, or overlook its contributions. The Euro-
zone crisis shows how with the UK out of the room the 
EU has still struggled to find the necessary solidarity 
and leadership to manage the crisis. The Eurozone 
crisis itself is both exacerbating Britain’s feeling of 
detachment from the EU, while also distracting atten-
tion by the rest of the EU from the possibility of a 
British withdrawal. 
The final problem is how the EU should manage 
relations with the UK after a withdrawal. Article 50 
requires any withdrawal agreement include a frame-
work for future relations with the withdrawing state. 
Despite what British Eurosceptics and Britain’s critics 
in the rest of the EU might wish, Britain and the EU 
will remain deeply interconnected. Indeed, the title of 
this paper itself highlights a common way of thinking 
that needs to be qualified: a withdrawal could never 
mean the end of Britain in Europe, only of the United 
Kingdom’s membership of the European Union. A 
withdrawal itself may take several years to action, and 
there exists the possibility of formal relations con-
tinuing afterwards in some way. Several options exist 
for EU-UK relations post-withdrawal. For example, 
agreement could be reached for the UK to adopt a 
Swiss or Norwegian model of relations with the EU. 
Each option contains pros and cons for the EU. The 
interconnections between the EU and UK, along with 
the likely desire of the UK to continue close relations 
with the EU as a means to an end of bolstering its own 
power and security, mean future relations could be 
positive. However, relations could easily become acri-
monious and competitive. 
While discussing a British withdrawal may seem 
to play into the hands of those who seek it, it is im-
portant to begin thinking about these issues as soon 
as possible so that they might be better handled if 
they do appear. Not only would a UK withdrawal pose 
problems and opportunities for solving the Eurozone 
crisis, it could also become something to address 
sooner than perhaps expected. This is not because 
a referendum may be triggered earlier than 2017, 
although this remains a slim possibility. It is because 
any renegotiation of Britain’s relationship inside the 
EU would almost certainly need to include discussion 
of what would happen should the British people vote 
to reject that renegotiated relationship and opt for 
withdrawal. 
This working paper aims to clarify some of the 
questions a withdrawal could present, draw attention 
to the contradicting outlooks on what a withdrawal 
could mean and highlight the need for further re-
search and discussion. The paper does so by dividing 
the topic into three sections. The first section provides 
the context; explaining what is happening in the UK, 
what role it has played in European integration and 
what response there has been from the rest of the EU 
to the UK’s current moves. The second section exam-
ines how a UK withdrawal would happen procedural-
ly, what I call the divorce proceedings. The final sec-
tion discusses life after the divorce. It examines the 
Europe-wide political, economic, ideological and geo-
political problems a UK withdrawal could pose for the 
EU and Europe. It also examines the options for UK-EU 
relations post-withdrawal. 
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Sleepwalking towards a British Exit 
 
David Cameron’s announcement committing a future 
Conservative government to renegotiating Britain’s 
relationship with the EU, to then be put to a refer-
endum, widely expected to be around 2017, did not 
come entirely as a surprise. Britain has struggled in 
its relationship with European integration since it 
began in the 1950s.1 As a victor of the Second Wold 
War, Britain thought of itself as more than a Euro-
pean power. Europe wasn’t seen as the choice Britain 
wanted to make, more a requirement of survival. This 
sense the EU is there to serve British ends, rather than 
as a means of serving the whole of Europe, lives on. 
As Cameron himself made clear, for Britain the EU is a 
“means to an end” with the “end” not being “ever 
closer union.”2
Despite this Britain has contributed significantly to 
the EU, albeit in an often Janus faced way. In formal 
government to government relations the British have 
often shown themselves to be constructive players, 
pushing forward European integration. That this has 
happened without the British people fully realising 
rests, in no small part, on the desire of successive 
governments to publically play down the degree of 
cooperation they have pursued. A failure of the wider 
political class to explain Europe and challenge mis-
conceptions has meant a growth in Euroscepticism 
that today is a norm of British politics. 
 
The Euro crisis has reduced further the British pub-
lic’s faith in the EU. Steps towards further integration, 
to help solve the crisis, have caused alarm the EU no 
longer reflects something the British are comfortable 
with. A common refrain in British politics is that the 
UK joined, and in a 1975 referendum on membership 
voted for, a “Common Market” as opposed to some 
form of political union.3
Added to this is a sense that a declining EU holds 
Britain back from dealing with the opportunities and 
threats of the modern world. As one Conservative MP 
 
 
1  See Andrew Gamble, Between Europe and America: The Future of 
British Politics (London, 2003). 
2  David Cameron, “The Future of the EU and the UK’s Rela-
tionship with It,” Speech, London, January 23, 2013, https:// 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg. 
3  Christopher Brooker and Richard North, The Great Deception: 
The Secret History of the EU (London: Continuum, 2003), 158–73. 
put it, in joining Europe “we shackled ourselves to 
a corpse.”4
As Cameron himself noted, a combination of 
changes to the EU that have taken it out of the UK’s 
“comfort zone,” along with a repeated failure to con-
sult the British people over this, has led to a situation 
where the “democratic consent for the EU in Britain 
is now wafer-thin”. Ignoring this, he argued, will only 
allow support for withdrawal to grow making the 
situation worse. The only solution, he argued, is not 
only to consult the people, but to seek a renegotiated 
relationship, settling Britain’s place in a changed EU. 
Once a new relationship has been outlined, it would 
be put to the British people to choose whether, in 
their opinion, it or leaving the EU is the best future for 
their country. 
 The situation has reached a point where 
some Conservative Party MPs even support UK with-
drawal from the Single Market, often seen as the 
mainstay of British membership. 
Numerous recent opinion polls indicate a growing 
willingness of the British people to vote for with-
drawal.5 While such polling results have been seen in 
the past (in 1980 one opinion poll found 71 per cent 
wanted the UK to withdraw6) this rise has been accom-
panied by the growth of the UK Independence Party, 
staunchly committed to securing the withdrawal of 
the UK from the EU.7 The rise of UKIP can be attrib-
uted to a number of factors such as immigration, the 
economy and as a protest vote exercised by an elec-
torate that for more than thirty years has shown a 
decreasing willingness to support two-party politics.8
 
4  Douglas Carswell, Hansard, October 26, 2012: Column 
1257, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 
cmhansrd/cm121026/debtext/121026-0002.htm. 
 
5  Rowland Watson, “Most Voters Want Britain to Quit 
EU, Poll Shows,” The Times, January 25, 2013, http://www. 
thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article3667906.ece. 
6  See Ipsos MORI’s “European Union Membership – 
Trends,” http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/ 
researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2435&view=wide. 
7  “How UKIP Became a British Political Force,” BCC News, 
May 3, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22396689. 
8  Simon Usherwood, UKIP’s Political Strategy: Opportunistic 
Idealism in a Fragmented Political Arena, Paper presented to the 
University Association for Contemporary European Studies, 
Bruges, September 2010, http://www.academia.edu/2312702/ 
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8 
It has also taken votes from all three main UK parties.9 
Nevertheless, the pressure it has brought to bear on 
Conservative Party MPs helped push Cameron into 
making his speech. His speech and commitment failed 
to stem the rise of UKIP, leading instead to further 
efforts by some Eurosceptics for a referendum within 
the current Parliament, due to end in 2015, or for 
legislation to be passed enabling the government, 
elected in 2015, to hold a referendum soon after 
coming into office.10
While Cameron wants Britain to remain a member 
of the EU, he did not rule out the possibility of his 
backing a withdrawal should a renegotiated relation-
ship not be possible. Developments within the Con-
servative Party should not lead to the assumption that 
arguments about Europe are confined solely to it. 
Europe was one of the driving issues behind a split in 
the Labour Party in the early 1980s. So far, current 
Labour Leader Ed Miliband has avoided committing to 
a referendum, preferring not to distract media atten-
tion from the Conservative infighting on the issue, 
which also serves to hide Labour’s own divisions on 
the issue. Pressure on him is slowly growing, but 
Miliband has ruled out a commitment to a referen-
dum for the time being. He fears committing to a 
referendum which a Labour government – with a slim 
majority or in coalition – would have to fight mid-
term, when the popularity of most governments is 
at their lowest.
 
11 Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal 
Democrat Party leader Nick Clegg has voiced his oppo-
sition to Cameron’s approach. But while his party is 
often portrayed as the most pro-European party, it 
has also committed itself to an in-out referendum 
to manage internal party tensions over the issue.12
 
UKIPs_Political_Strategy_Opportunistic_Idealism_in_a_ 
Fragmented_Political_Arena. 
 
9  Philip Webster, “Not an Earthquake, But UKIP’s Tremors 
Will Spread through All Parties,” The Times, May 3, 2013, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article3755664. 
ece. 
10  “EU Referendum: Tory MP Will Take forward Bill,” BBC 
News, May 16, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
22542207. 
11  John Rentoul, “Ed Miliband on Europe,” The Independent, 
May 12, 2013, http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2013/05/12/ 
ed-miliband-on-europe/?utm_source=British+Influence+ 
supporters&utm_campaign=dbcd62b950-EuropeWatch+ 
2013-05-13&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c24f34caff-
dbcd62b950-315150137. 
12  George Eaton, “When Clegg Supported an EU Refer-
endum,” New Statesman, October 22, 2011, http://www. 
newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/10/referendum-
membership-lib. 
Cameron’s call for a referendum drew support from 
people on both left and right, Eurosceptic and Euro-
phile. Pro-European Timothy Garton-Ash, writing in 
the lead up to the speech was impatient: “Bring it on, 
I say, and may the best arguments win”.13 Professor 
Vernon Bogdanor, Cameron’s former Oxford tutor, 
urged the Labour party to back the referendum: “The 
EU is an elite project without popular support. Labour 
can bring it back to the people.”14 In a speech backing 
Cameron’s plan, former Conservative Prime Minister 
Sir John Major best captured the hopes for a referen-
dum: “The relationship with Europe has poisoned Brit-
ish politics for too long, distracted parliament from 
other issues and come close to destroying the Conser-
vative party. It is time to resolve the matter.”15
A fight back by pro-Europeans has begun. There is 
still a good chance that when presented with a choice, 
and a campaign countering a Eurosceptic message 
which has so far dominated British politics, the British 
will vote to stay in the EU, even if on modified terms 
that puts them in some outer-circle of the EU. Never-
theless, the outlook is not encouraging. Compared 
with the last time the UK held a referendum in 1975 
support from the business community, the media and 
the political parties is not as united. Pro-European 
campaign groups are weak in comparison to the large 
number of Eurosceptic groups who are well organised 
and funded.
 
16 As David Rennie notes: “As an idea, the 
possibility of British withdrawal is becoming normal-
ized.”17
This combination of a largely unchecked Euroscep-
tic agenda, moves by the EU towards closer political 
union, growing public dissatisfaction, EU partners 
resigning themselves to Britain’s departure and David 
 
 
13  Timothy Garton Ash, “A Referendum on Europe? Bring 
It On, For All Our Sakes,” The Guardian, December 20, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/20/ 
referendum-europe-bring-it-on. 
14  Vernon Bogdanor, “Why the Left Should Support a Refer-
endum on Europe,” The Guardian, January 27, 2012, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/27/left-should-
support-referendum-europe. 
15  John Major, The Referendum on Europe: Opportunity or Threat? 
(London: Chatham House, February 14, 2013), http://www. 
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/ 
Meeting%20Transcripts/140213Major.pdf. 
16  Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin, “Euroscepticism as a 
Persistent Phenomenon,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51, 
no. 1 (2013): 1–16. 
17  David Rennie, The Continent of the Open Sea? Does Britain Have 
a European Future? (London: Centre for European Reform, May 
2012), 75, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/ 
2012/continent-or-open-sea-does-britain-have-european-future. 
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Cameron’s strategy, which only seems to have further 
whetted the appetite of Eurosceptics, led Labour 
Leader Ed Milband to warn Britain may be sleepwalk-
ing towards the exit door from the EU.18
The EU’s Response 
 
Responses from across the rest of the EU to Cameron’s 
commitment, and to the wider British debate about its 
membership of the EU, divide into four groups. First, 
while there were wide differences of opinion on what 
Cameron set out to achieve, there was a general recog-
nition that parts of the speech were constructive. 
Finnish EU Affairs Minister, Alex Stubb, described the 
speech as one which has, “opened the door for an 
honest debate, and I hope those people who really care 
for Europe, and for the UK, for that matter, come out 
and have an honest debate.”19 Second, the majority of 
responses critiqued the type of relationship Cameron 
hoped the UK can achieve within the EU. The focus 
here was on what such a relationship would mean for 
the EU, with most focus being on how such a change 
could unleash destructive centrifugal forces that 
would weaken wider European unity. For Carl Bildt, 
the Swedish foreign minister, “Flexibility sounds fine, 
but if you open up to a 28-speed Europe, at the end 
of the day there is no Europe at all. Just a mess.”20 As 
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said, 
“Germany wants the United Kingdom to remain an 
active and constructive part of the European Union ... 
But cherry picking is not an option. Europe isn’t the 
sum of national interests but a community with a 
common fate in difficult times.”21
 
18  Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Risks ‘Sleepwalking’ 
UK out of EU, Warns Miliband,” The Guardian, January 13, 
2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/13/david-
cameron-sleepwalking-eu-ed-miliband. 
 The third group of 
responses pointed out what a withdrawal could do to 
19  Cassell Bryan-Low, “UK’s Cameron Draws Fire over Europe 
Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2013, http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873235398045782592030999
15538.html. 
20  Carsten Volkery, “Referendum Reactions: Cameron Faces 
Heat over Continent,” Spiegel Online, January 24, 2013, http:// 
www.spiegel.de/international/europe/cameron-finds-little-
support-on-continent-for-referendum-on-eu-a-879441.html. 
21  Carsten Volkery, “Cameron’s Collision Course: London 
Takes Major Gamble with EU Referendum,” Spiegel Online, 
January 23, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/ 
europe/analysis-and-reaction-on-david-cameron-s-plan-for-a-
referendum-on-eu-a-879241.html. 
the UK. Joschka Fischer, former German foreign minis-
ter, best summarised most such opinion when he said: 
“For the EU, Britain’s exit would be a heavy blow, but 
for the British it would be a real disaster ...”22 Finally, 
only a few responses focused on the potential impact 
on the EU of a UK withdrawal, rather than a renego-
tiated relationship. For Franco Frattini, former Italian 
Foreign Minister, the “United Kingdom is an indis-
soluble part of the European Integration Process. I 
wish London will decide to remain in Europe.” Swe-
den’s Aftonbladet newspaper made clear a British exit 
would be: “to Britain, Europe and Sweden’s disadvan-
tage. For Swedish part, we would lose an important 
partner in the EU, we are close to the UK on many 
issues, and it would be unfortunate for the Swedish 
political interests. The EU as a whole is losing a strong 
and important State. As the UK is one of the three 
heavy-weight countries in the EU, the whole Union hit 
hard by an exit. With Britain outside the EU would be 
a weaker Europe. It brings economic strength, military 
reach and credibility in international politics.”23
Some have concluded Britain is headed for the 
exit whatever the rest of the EU does.
 
24
It would be wrong for the EU to shy away from dis-
cussing openly and in detail the implications of the 
 Yet even those 
resigned to the idea that Britain is on its way out, 
have not outlined what this could mean for the EU. 
As noted above, most discussion has focused on the 
implications for the EU of a renegotiated relationship 
for the UK inside the EU. The implications of a with-
drawal tend to be caught up in such discussions, often 
being mentioned as an after-thought. This is hardly a 
surprise. The exact process for a member state to with-
draw is vague. The political implications are even 
vaguer. Discussing withdrawal of any member state 
has long been a taboo. In Britain’s case this might also 
be fuelled by fears such talk could become self-fulfill-
ing, or play into the hands of those in Britain who 
argue Britain could not be let go and so the rest of the 
EU must meet its demands. 
 
22  “Cameron Referendum Speech: EU Reaction,” BBC News, 
January 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
21159365. 
23  Jessica Elgot, “David Cameron’s EU Speech: Europe’s Poli-
ticians and Media Condemn In/Out Referendum,” Huffington 
Post, January 23, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 
2013/01/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-politicians-europe-
referendum_n_2531996.html. 
24  “UK’s Slide to EU Exit Door Will Be Difficult to Reverse,” 
The Irish Times, November 27, 2012, http://www.irishtimes. 
com/debate/uk-s-slide-to-eu-exit-door-will-be-difficult-to-
reverse-1.557470. 
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10 
withdrawal of one of its largest members, given the 
potential knock-on effects of such an event could be 
similar to those of agreeing to a renegotiated rela-
tionship. Indeed, whether the rest of the EU likes it or 
not, any British renegotiation will inevitably touch on 
the sensitive issue of a withdrawal. While neither the 
British nor EU representatives will likely relish such 
discussions they will need to be had. First, the British 
people, media, business and civil society will need 
to know what voting to leave will mean, leading the 
British government to at least have some form of 
outline to put to them. Second, the British and EU 
representatives will need to agree an arrangement to 
provide at least some limited political and economic 
stability for both the UK and the EU, should the British 
vote to withdraw. Failure to do this would lead to a 
myriad of political, economic and legal questions ex-
ploding onto the agenda the moment it became clear 
the British had voted to withdraw. 
That the prospect of a British withdrawal is over-
shadowed by the problems of the Euro crisis should 
not detract from what would be an historic event in 
European integration. The rest of the EU cannot repeat 
the concern the UK is sleepwalking towards an EU 
exit, when the EU itself may be asleep to what this 
could mean for it. 
What Does the UK Contribute to the EU? 
With the debate about Britain’s withdrawal domi-
nated mainly by British arguments about the utility 
of the EU to the UK, it is easy for both the UK and the 
EU to overlook what the UK means for the EU: what it 
directly contributes, what it has helped build, what 
part it has played in the history and idea of European 
integration. Arguably some of the UK’s contributions 
have also been negative ones, something we turn to 
later in the paper. 
The clearest implications of a UK withdrawal would 
be the loss of nearly 12.5 per cent of the EU’s popula-
tion and almost 14.8 per cent of its economy.25
 
25  Population figures calculate from Eurostat figures for 
2011: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do? 
dataset=demo_gind&lang=en. Economic figure calculated 
from Eurostat figures for 2013 GDP at current prices. UK 
economy is €1,940,659.6 billion of the EU’s €13,086,459.2 
billion economy, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ 
show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c&lang=en. 
 While 
it has plenty of problems, Britain’s €1.9 trillion 
economy is the world’s sixth largest and amongst its 
most dynamic. It represents 19.4 per cent of EU 
exports (excluding intra-EU trade).26 Within the EU it 
runs an overall deficit in goods and service with other 
member states, in 2011 estimated at £28 billion.27 The 
City of London, the world’s pre-eminent financial 
services centre, is a significant asset to both Britain 
and the EU. The UK has been a favourite destination 
for inward investment in the EU.28 It has also been one 
of the most attractive destinations for other EU 
citizens, being home to around 2 million EU citizens.29
The UK is one of the largest overall contributors to 
the EU budget. In 2011 its gross contribution was 
€14,869.3 million. After a UK rebate of €3,595.9 
million the contribution paid was €11,273.4 million. 
After receipts of €6,570 million, the UK is a net 
contributor of €4,703.4 million, placing it amongst 
the largest net contributors. Without the budget 
rebate Britain’s net contribution in 2011 would have 
been €8,229.3 million, compared to Germany’s 
€7,538.1 million.
 
30 While the political relationship 
can be acrimonious, the relationship between the EU 
and British officials and government institutions has 
not been as difficult, although the political relation-
ship has affected it.31
Britain’s strong support for liberal free trade has 
helped drive forward the Single Market, sometimes 
claimed by the British as entirely their invention. 
While a strong degree of ambivalence has emerged 
over the free movement of peoples to Britain, the 
British government continues to push for further 
free movement of goods, capital and especially of 
 
 
26  Right Speech, Right Time? (London: Open Europe, January 
22, 2012), 10, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/ 
Documents/Pdfs/EuropeSpeech.pdf. 
27  See answer from Baroness Warsi, Hansard, HL Deb, Novem-
ber 14, 2012, c1507, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/121114-0001.htm#12111438000002. 
28  “UK Tops European Inwards and Outward FDI Tables,” FDI 
Intelligence, 2013, http://www.fdiintelligence.com/index.php/ 
Info/What-s-New/Press-releases/UK-tops-European-inward-and-
outward-FDI-tables. 
29  Eurostat, Foreign Citizens and Foreign-born Population, July 11, 
2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-
11072012-AP/EN/3-11072012-AP-EN.PDF. 
30  EU Budget 2011, Financial Report (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/ 
publications/2011/fin_report/fin_report_11_en.pdf. 
31  Ricardo Gomez et al., European Union Policy Making in the 
UK: A Brief History, Papers in Politics, Paper No. 5 (Manchester, 
May 14, 2003), http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/ 
disciplines/politics/publications/workingpapers/documents/ 
manchester_working_papers/MPP072003.pdf. 
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services.32
In supporting the single market, British govern-
ments have shown a keen interest in questioning and 
minimising unwanted interference by the EU. The cur-
rent British government’s “Balance of Competences 
Review,” looking into almost every area of EU activity, 
reflects a willingness, perhaps sometimes too forth-
right (and often viewed suspiciously as cloaking 
national self-interest), to openly question, analyse and 
seek changes to the direction of the EU and the role it 
plays in the economic and political life of the member 
states.
 Its interest in uniting Eastern and Western 
Europe led it to strongly back European enlargement, 
albeit with a hope such widening would weaken ef-
forts to deepen European integration. A similar com-
mitment can be found towards extending free trade 
agreements, an Atlantic free trade area re-emerging as 
a clear British aim. 
33
With France it stands as the other major EU mili-
tary and nuclear power, with a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council, all backed by an extensive diplo-
matic and intelligence network. Britain expects a lot 
of its soft power, whether through the institutions of 
the BBC World Service and British Council, wider cul-
tural and sporting activities, economic and scientific 
innovation, or its leading role in international devel-
opment. Britain has been central to efforts to create a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, to make the EU 
think geopolitically and provide it with some form of 
defence capability. Links to the USA might sometimes 
be overplayed and to an extent warp British views of 
their place in the world. However, British Prime Minis-
ters have sought to use this relationship not only 
for Britain’s benefit, but to ensure the USA remains 
engaged in European security and to uphold NATO 
as the world’s most powerful military alliance. 
 
It would be narrow-sited to consider simply Brit-
ain’s contributions to the EU without also recalling 
her wider part in European culture, for example her 
innumerable contributions in sport, art, literature, 
philosophy and science. With a growing population 
some predictions put Britain as the largest EU mem-
 
32  Jo Johnson, Britain Must Defend the Single Market (London: 
Centre for European Reform, June 2012), http://www. 
socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/ 
publications/workingpapers/documents/manchester_ 
working_papers/MPP072003.pdf. 
33  Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Snubbed as Germany and 
France Ignore UK Survey on Europe,” The Guardian, April 1, 
2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/apr/01/david-
cameron-eu-survey-merkel. 
ber sometime between 2040 and 2050.34
 
 The British 
might struggle to identify themselves as European, 
but Britain is and always has been a core part of Euro-
pean and wider Western civilisation. 
 
 
 
34  Eurostat, “Ageing Characterises the Demographic 
Perspectives of the European Societies,” Statistics in Focus, 
no. 72, (2008): 5, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ 
ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-072/EN/KS-SF-08-072-EN.PDF. 
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The UK-EU Divorce Proceedings 
 
The impact of a British withdrawal would be felt in 
two stages. The first stage, the process by which the 
UK would trigger and negotiate its withdrawal, would 
expose the EU to the untested process of managing 
the withdrawal of a member state. As this section dis-
cusses, such a process will be dogged by uncertainties 
and unclear procedure. It will present awkward oppor-
tunities for change to the EU’s own institutions and 
balance of power. Negotiations will need to cover 
everything from legal minutiae through to geo-politi-
cal questions of European defence and security. 
Taking this forward will be a delicate operation, with 
more than enough time and opportunities for ani-
mosity to develop on all sides. Getting the process 
right will be essential for the second stage of living 
with what is agreed, something we turn to in the 
next section. 
The Taboo of Withdrawal 
The idea of a member state voluntarily withdrawing 
from the EU, or its predecessor organisations, passed 
unmentioned in the treaties until the European Con-
stitution.35 Nobody denied a member state could, 
under international law, withdraw should it wish. 
This had been part of the in-out referendum Britain 
held in 1975, something no other member state 
contested.36 This remains the case today. There is 
nothing to legally stop the UK from unilaterally with-
drawing. Doing so would involve the British Parlia-
ment repealing the 1972 European Communities Act, 
which provided for UK membership of the then Euro-
pean Community. There have been attempts by Con-
servative MPs to do this.37
 
35  For a good discussion of the history behind the idea of an 
EU member state withdrawing from the EU and/or EMU see 
Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and 
EMU: Some Reflections, European Central Bank Legal Working 
Paper Series, no. 10 (Frankfurt, 2009), http://www.ecb.int/ 
pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf. 
 But, while this could be 
36  Ibid., 21–22. 
37  “MPs Debate Case for UK Pulling Out of European Union,” 
BBC News, October 26, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-20085437. 
legal and assert the idea of the British Parliament as 
sovereign, it immediately runs into real-world prob-
lems which show sovereignty is not quite so simple. 
The UK would still have to abide by many of the obli-
gations it has entered into with the EU.38
Fears have long existed that making explicit a pro-
cedure for withdrawal could encourage member states 
to question their commitment to the EU, or use the 
threat of withdrawal should they fail to get their way 
on an issue.
 More impor-
tantly, the sheer economic and political costs of such 
a move mean the UK would have to work with the EU 
to negotiate and manage the implications of a with-
drawal. Failure to do this would lead to a myriad of 
political, economic and legal problems. The EU would 
certainly be compelled to negotiate in order to try and 
limit such damage to it. 
39 Alongside such fears were deep uncer-
tainties as to what withdrawal would mean for Euro-
pean integration. During the European Convention, 
the Dutch Government made clear that in its opinion: 
“facilitating the possibility to withdraw from the 
Union is contrary to the idea of European integration 
as set out in the preamble of the TEU: ‘Resolved to 
continue the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe’.”40 How exactly with-
drawal would take place, was another problem. The 
withdrawals of Greenland in 1985 and Algeria in 1962 
had prompted concerns they set precedents for the 
withdrawal of a member state, but as overseas terri-
tories they provided little by way of a guide to how 
an actual member state might withdraw.41
 
38  Damien Chalmers, Democratic Self-Government in Europe, 
Policy Network Paper (London, 2013), 14–15, http://www. 
policy-network.net/publications/4399/Democratic-Self-
Government-in-Europe. 
 
39  See amendment from Elmar Brok et al., Convention on 
the Future of Europe (2002), 7, http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf. 
40  See amendment from the Dutch Government, Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe (2002), 19, http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf. 
41  For a discussion of the withdrawal of Greenland see House 
of Commons Library, Leaving the EU, Research Paper RP13/42 
(August 2013), 12–13, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/RP13-42. 
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It wasn’t until the 2001–03 European Convention 
that wording was put forward for a withdrawal clause. 
The initial proposal, Article I-59, became in the final 
draft Article I-60. Following the abandonment of the 
European Constitution it became, without any change 
to the wording, Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union, the first part of new Treaty of Lisbon.42
Article 50 
 
Article I-60 had been included in the European Con-
stitution on the grounds that should it be invoked 
it could provide at least a semblance of order to an 
unprecedented event in European integration.43 As 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty it is this article that 
Britain and the EU would follow in the event of a 
British withdrawal.44
Under Article 50 the British Government would, in 
writing, inform the European Council of its intention 
to withdraw the UK from the EU. The European Com-
mission would then put forward a nomination for an 
EU negotiator to be approved by the Council. EU and 
UK negotiating teams would then draw up a with-
drawal agreement, setting out “the arrangements for 
its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for 
its future relationship with the Union”. The frame-
work for future relations refers to arrangements such 
as the UK securing a free trade relationship with the 
EU, a relationship through membership of the Euro-
pean Economic Area, or some other arrangement. 
 
Once the negotiating teams had concluded a with-
drawal agreement, it would be put to the European 
Council to agree through a qualified majority vote, 
after the consent of the European Parliament had 
been obtained. Article 50 defines a qualified majority 
vote in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union which 
requires “at least 72% of the members of the Council 
representing the participating Member States, com-
prising at least 65% of the population of these States.” 
 
42  Open Europe, The Lisbon Treaty and the European Constitution: 
A Side-by-Side Comparison (2008), 46, http://www.ecln.net/ 
documents/lisbon/lisbon_-_constitution_side_by_side_open_ 
europe.pdf. 
43  Dana Spinant, “Giscard Forum to Unveil Controversial 
EU ‘Exit Clause’,” EuropeanVoice.com, April 3, 2003, http://www. 
europeanvoice.com/article/imported/giscard-forum-set-to-
unveil-controversial-eu-exit-clause-/47086.aspx. 
44  The wording of the article is set out in the appendix of 
this paper, p. 30. 
The remaining member states, or the European 
Parliament, could vote to reject the agreement. Pos-
sible reasons for this could include it being seen as 
too beneficial to the UK, unfair on the EU or because 
of weaknesses, problems or technicalities identified in 
discussions before the vote. A withdrawal agreement 
is not a precondition to withdrawal, so such a vote 
could not prevent the UK from exercising the right 
to withdraw, only reject the conditions the EU was 
willing to grant for a withdrawal and post-withdrawal 
relationship. Whether a new agreement would then 
be sought would depend largely on how keen the UK 
and the Council would be to continue negotiating. 
The wording of Article 50 places no obligation on 
the UK to negotiate, only an obligation on the Council 
to do so. It is also the Council that is the negotiating 
partner, not the member states. A limit of two years 
is given for negotiations, extension being possible 
through agreement between the UK and unanimous 
agreement of the Council. If the council could not 
reach a unanimous agreement to grant an extension, 
then negotiations would end. The UK and EU could 
reach agreement for a withdrawal agreement to be 
enacted before the two year limit expires. 
During the period of negotiations the UK could play 
no part in discussions or decisions in the European 
Council or Council of Ministers relating to its with-
drawal, but could continue to exercise all other 
powers and rights of a member state. As the explana-
tory notes on the European Constitution make clear: 
“Withdrawal of a member state from the EU cannot 
be made conditional upon the conclusion of a with-
drawal agreement.”45
Article 50 also makes clear that should the UK wish 
to become a member again it would need to apply 
in the same way as any new applicant. The European 
 If no withdrawal agreement and 
framework for its future relations were agreed within 
the two years, or before any extension expired, then 
the UK would leave the EU taking up a relationship 
with the EU akin to that of any other member of the 
World Trade Organisation that has no specific rela-
tionship with the EU. As we discuss further below, 
failure to secure a withdrawal agreement would also 
mean a failure to agree a framework for future rela-
tions meaning the UK could not remain a member of 
the European Economic Area, or have moved to some 
form of free trade agreement with the EU. 
 
45  Vaughne Miller, In Brief: Leaving the European Union. House of 
Commons Library, Standard Note SN/IA/6089, October 28, 2011, 
2, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06089. 
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Convention rejected proposals suggesting that in 
order to prevent abuse of the procedure, a withdraw-
ing member state should be subject to a waiting 
period of 5 years before reapplying.46
The Withdrawal Negotiations 
 Should it wish 
to do so, the UK could reapply for membership the 
day after withdrawing. 
The EU and British negotiators would face a consider-
able task. Without a well drafted withdrawal agree-
ment there would be the possibility of endless legal 
arguments and doubts as to the legal status of British 
and EU persons, legal entities in both the UK and the 
EU, and agreements and treaties entered into by 
the EU and UK. There would also be great uncertainty 
over the future relationship between the two. 
Agreement with the UK would need to be reached 
over the large number of shared projects and commit-
ments. If we take the Swiss-EU relationship as a work-
ing model, then the UK and EU would need to reach 
agreement over: the free movement of persons, civil 
aviation, overland transport, agriculture, technical 
barriers to trade, public procurement, scientific 
research, Schengen, fraud, education, statistics, en-
vironment, media, taxation of savings, pensions, 
Europol and Eurojust.47
The status of British citizens working for EU institu-
tions would need to be agreed. Agreement would also 
need to be reached about the status of the citizens of 
other EU member states living in Britain and the 
Britons living elsewhere in the EU. Accurate figures 
of EU nationals living in the UK, or of UK nationals 
 For the UK such a list is like-
ly to be far longer, reflecting the UK’s forty years of 
membership which have led to a far more comprehen-
sive relationship. Many treaties negotiated with third 
countries would need updating. Britain would need to 
take steps to alter its domestic laws. While in 1975 it 
might have been possible to return to the status-quo 
before UK membership started in 1973, after forty 
years of membership the EU’s influence is now so 
widespread it would continue to be felt after with-
drawal. The UK would need to reach agreement over 
how this is managed. 
 
46  See amendment from Mr Vastagh, Convention on the 
Future of Europe (2002), 55, http://european-convention. 
eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf. 
47  Details of these agreements are available at the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs: http://www.europa. 
admin.ch/themen/00500/index.html?lang=en. 
living in other EU states, are notoriously difficult to 
agree. Estimates of the number of citizens of other EU 
member states living in the UK range from 1.6 million 
to 2.2 million. The number of Britons living elsewhere 
in the EU may be as high as 1.66 million, although it 
may be lower.48 What rights British and EU citizens 
would hold would depend on what post-withdrawal 
framework was agreed, for example whether this 
would see the UK remain a member of the EEA. It is 
worth noting that termination of a treaty, such as 
Britain’s membership of the EU, can only affect its 
continuing obligations along with the continuing 
obligations of other member states to it. “Thus, any 
rights which a state had acquired against the other 
Member States and vice versa, prior to the termination 
or withdrawal, would continue to be effective, and any 
which arise or continue after that date, would not.”49
The UK may not have to trigger Article 50 to begin 
some form of negotiations about what a withdrawal 
might entail. Such negotiations could form part of any 
attempt at a renegotiation of Britain’s membership, 
something David Cameron hopes to pursue before 
holding an “in-out” referendum. The British govern-
ment will come under pressure from both Parliament 
and the general public to explain what would happen 
if the British people voted to leave instead of endors-
ing any renegotiated relationship for staying within 
the EU. Allowing a renegotiation to include an outline 
of what a withdrawal and future relationship might 
entail could seem to play to those seeking withdrawal, 
although those backing withdrawal are far from 
united in their view of what a relationship on the out-
side should look like. However, both the UK and the 
EU have a vested interested in ensuring economic 
stability around the time of a referendum. A vote to 
leave, with no clear idea of what this would entail, 
could lead to substantial economic costs for both sides 
as markets speculated as to what withdrawal agree-
ment might now be secured. 
 
Finally, the political mood on both sides will shape 
withdrawal. It may be that the British government 
 
48  For Eurostat figures on the number of citizens from 
other EU states living in another EU state, see Katya Vasileva, 
Eurostat Statistics in Focus, 31/2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec. 
europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-031/EN/KS-SF-12-031-
EN.PDF. For a discussion of the number of UK nationals living 
elsewhere in the EU see Cathy Newman, “Does Number of 
European Here Equal Brits Abroad?,” C4 FactCheck blog, April 
29, 2010, http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/does-number-
of-europeans-here-equal-brits-abroad/2322 
49  Miller, In Brief: Leaving the European Union (see note 45), 3. 
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negotiating a withdrawal had led the defeated cam-
paign to stay in the EU. In negotiations they may seek 
sympathy. The rest of the EU may be in no mood to 
offer concessions if the British people had rejected a 
renegotiated relationship seen as generous. 
Institutional and Budgetary Changes 
The process of making internal EU changes to handle 
a British withdrawal could mirror those used for 
adapting to an enlargement, only this time – and for 
the first time – going in the opposite direction. Many 
of the changes noted here will have wider political 
implications discussed later in this paper. 
A European Council would need to decide on 
changes to the system of QMV, so as to reflect the dis-
appearance of the UK with its 29 votes. In the ensuing 
negotiations, all states will be mindful of the numer-
ous scenarios for how this could change the balance of 
power within the Council, for example between small 
versus large states, north versus south, protectionist 
versus liberal and so forth. This is discussed in more 
detail later. 
Britain’s 73 seats in the European Parliament would 
need to be redistributed. The process of allocating 
seats has always been an unclear one, subject as it is 
to numerous formulas, solutions and political horse-
trading.50
Depending on the date of a UK withdrawal arrange-
ments may need to be put in place for British MEPs to 
leave the Parliament before the elections due in 2019. 
Article 50 does not exclude British MEPs from partici-
pating in or voting on legislation and proposals right 
up to the date of a UK withdrawal. It also does not 
 The British allocation could be redistributed 
with, perhaps, the current cap of 96 MEPs – as applied 
to Germany – being raised. Alternatively, a British 
withdrawal could be used to reduce by 73 members 
the size of the European Parliament, currently limited 
to 751 members. The European political party group-
ings would see the disappearance of the British con-
tingents in the European Parliament and a change 
to associate membership for their involvement in the 
wider activities of groups such as the Party of Euro-
pean Socialists, the Alliance for Liberals and Democ-
rats for Europe Party and the European Free Alliance. 
 
50  Richard Rose and Patrick Bernhagen, Inequalities in Repre-
sentation in the European Parliament, Paper presented to the 
ECPR 5th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Porto, 
(2010), http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/ 
125.pdf. 
exclude them from playing a part in granting or 
denying the consent the European Parliament is 
required to give to any withdrawal agreement. Article 
50 only makes mention of the member state’s repre-
sentatives in the European Council and Council. 
Other institutional changes include the loss of the 
UK’s European Commissioner, the removal of British 
judges from the European Court of Justice and 
changes to any quotas specifying the employment or 
representation of British citizens or delegates in EU 
bodies, for example in the EU Military Staff. While 
English is likely to remain the working language of 
the EU, some questions will be raised about its wide-
spread usage, given only Ireland and Malta would 
remain as the member states where English is an 
official language. 
Finally, the EU budget would need to be rebalanced. 
Discussion in 2019–2020 for the Multi-Annual Finan-
cial Framework 2021–2027 could take place close to 
any date of a UK withdrawal. The UK is one of the 
largest overall net contributors to the EU budget. In 
2011 it paid in €11,273.4 million, this figure taking 
into account the UK rebate. A UK withdrawal would 
end the issue of the rebate, in 2011 worth €3,595.9 
million. It would also mean the EU would no longer 
have to pay the UK €6,570 million in EU funding for 
areas such as agriculture, research and regional devel-
opment. But this would leave the EU to make up for 
the UK’s net contribution, which in 2011 was €4,703.4 
million. This is similar to the net contributions of 
€4,888.5 million from France and €4,750.3 million 
from Italy. Germany’s net contribution was €7,538.1 
million.51 Replacing this may require larger budgetary 
contributions from member states such as Germany 
and France. However, the scale of any financial 
changes might not be clear until a post-withdrawal 
framework was agreed with the UK. If the UK adopted 
a relationship similar to Switzerland or Norway then 
as with those states it may be required to make a 
financial contribution in exchange for its relationship 
with the EU. One estimate, using Norway as a guide, 
puts a UK contribution at approximately €4 billion a 
year.52
 
51  EU Budget 2011, Financial Report (Brussels: European Com-
mission, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/ 
publications/2011/fin_report/fin_report_11_en.pdf. 
 Another estimate, using the EU-Swiss relation-
52  David Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian 
Lessons for the UK (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012), 
11, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/ 
attachments/pdf/2012/buchan_swiss_norway_11oct12-
6427.pdf. 
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ship as an the guide, provides a figure of approximate-
ly €1.4 billion.53
The Timescale 
 However, Norway and Switzerland 
exercise a degree of control over how their money is 
spent. The UK, for example, could opt to arrange bi-
laterally for parts of its contribution to be spent in 
states in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. 
If David Cameron were to realise his commitment to 
a renegotiation following a general election victory in 
May 2015, then most predictions put an ensuing refer-
endum at some point around 2017. If the result was 
for a withdrawal it could mean a withdrawal agree-
ment coming into force sometime in 2019, if the two 
year framework of Article 50 were used to the full, po-
tentially longer if an extension were agreed. Between 
now and 2019 both the EU and UK face a period of flux 
in their constitutional and political arrangements, the 
EU with the Eurozone and the UK with Scotland. If 
the UK continues to struggle economically, or face 
political difficulties such as party splits or the collapse 
of a government, especially if this is connected with 
a renegotiation or withdrawal, then the impact of 
the UK’s withdrawal on the rest of the EU would be 
reduced. Equally, however, should the Eurozone 
continue to face difficulties and fail to see economic 
growth, then the UK’s position could be boosted, 
exacerbating the implications for the EU. 
Britain’s involvement in some policy areas may last 
longer than some anticipate. Under Article 50 the UK 
would be excluded from discussions in the European 
Council and Council of Ministers concerning its with-
drawal, but could continue its involvement in decision 
making on all other EU matters until the end of mem-
bership. This would inevitably prompt concerns about 
UK influence over policy to be implemented after its 
withdrawal. After withdrawal British involvement in 
the EU’s formal decision making would end, but as 
discussed later, British pressure and lobbying would 
not disappear. The UK could also continue to be in-
volved in European projects and policies, for example 
like Norway and Switzerland have opted to do with 
Schengen. 
The timescale of negotiating a British withdrawal 
could present problems for the European Court of 
 
53  Ruth Lea, Britain’s Contribution to the EU (London: TaxPayers’ 
Alliance), 8–9, http://www.global-vision.net/files/downloads/ 
download1155.pdf. 
Justice, which may be unable to hear or settle all 
necessary cases connected to the UK during the two 
years, or however long the withdrawal negotiations 
take. 
There exists the possibility of some admittedly 
extreme scenarios delaying withdrawal. For example, 
the UK may opt to hold a second referendum to check 
the British people are prepared to accept the with-
drawal agreement, which might not have been clear 
when they first voted to withdraw. The British Parlia-
ment may also vote to reject any withdrawal agree-
ment, demanding further negotiations. 
It is also unclear as to what would happen if during 
the withdrawal negotiations the incumbent UK gov-
ernment collapsed and a new one was elected com-
mitted to reversing the decision to withdraw. There 
may also be some legal challenges in the UK and from 
elsewhere in the EU as to the legality of any with-
drawal. Challenges from elsewhere in the EU are likely 
to draw on the idea of European integration as irre-
versible; meaning article 50 is somehow unconstitu-
tional.54 If in 2014 the Scottish vote in favour of inde-
pendence, then withdrawal of the remaining UK could 
be complicated by the process of admitting Scotland 
as a member of the EU. Scotland’s position with 
regard to EU membership is already subject to some 
doubts and controversy.55
The prospect of a British withdrawal may encour-
age some within the EU to act as if the UK is no longer 
a member. Indeed, with the UK already absenting it-
self from several EU forums such as the Eurozone, the 
rest of the EU may find they grow into an arrange-
ment where the UK is absent. Side-lining the UK may 
then appear a fruitful way of dealing with its with-
drawal. However, the time frame could mean the rest 
of the EU is in for a several year wait. There will be 
plenty of opportunities for frustration and animosity 
to develop on both sides, especially if this followed a 
strained attempt at a renegotiated relationship. 
 While it currently seems 
unlikely to happen, there have been occasional calls 
for an independent Scotland to hold its own referen-
dum on EU membership. 
 
54  See amendment from the Dutch Government, Con-
vention on the Future of Europe (2002) 19, http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf. 
55  Severin Carell, “Barroso Casts Doubts on Independent 
Scotland’s EU Membership Rights,” The Guardian, September 
12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/sep/12/ 
barroso-doubt-scotland-eu-membership. 
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Learning Lessons and Expulsion 
By testing and clarifying Article 50, a British with-
drawal would set precedents for any future withdraw-
als. As noted above, there exist concerns this could 
encourage other members to threaten withdrawal 
should they fail to get their way. It could also raise 
political questions about the direction of European 
integration, an issue considered later in the paper. 
A British withdrawal could also make the option of 
expelling a member state more plausible. Compared 
to withdrawal, expelling a member would be an 
even bigger political challenge and legal nightmare, 
because of the possibility of endless legal challenges 
from governments and private individuals. Expulsion 
of a member of the Euro zone would be even more 
difficult, perhaps close to impossible.56
The difficulties of expulsion also mean that should 
insufficient effort be made by the rest of the EU to 
try and keep Britain from withdrawing, then any with-
drawal may come to be viewed, especially in Britain, 
as a passive expulsion. 
 Nevertheless, 
the experiences of a British withdrawal could provide 
some form of guide for expulsion. Even if the possi-
bility of expulsion remained a deeply unattractive 
one, the experience of dealing with Britain may 
increase calls that this happen or be threatened. 
 
 
 
56  See Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and 
EMU: Some Reflections (see note 35). 
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Life after the Divorce 
 
Concluding a withdrawal agreement and framework 
for future relations would only be the end of the 
beginning of a much longer relationship with the UK 
outside the EU. This second stage would require the 
EU to make four sets of adjustments to come to terms 
with Britain’s absence. First, the EU’s leadership and 
coordination would be faced with a period of change. 
Second, the UK will not disappear completely from EU 
political discussions or networks. Both sides will need 
to reach agreement on how to manage the agreed 
framework for future relations. Third, the EU will 
have to face the wider geopolitical implications of a 
UK withdrawal. Finally, the EU will need to handle 
the potential a British withdrawal has for challenging 
current forms of European integration and pan-Euro-
pean cooperation. 
The Operation of an EU without the UK 
The departure of the UK would present the EU with 
a period of institutional upheaval with two inter-
connected questions overshadowing developments. 
First, would the EU become easier to manage and 
lead? Second, who and what ideas would benefit from 
a UK withdrawal and where would this leave the EU? 
Given Britain’s reputation as “an awkward partner” 
it is easy to assume the EU will become easier to 
manage and lead.57
 
57  Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the Euro-
pean Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and 
Charles Grant, Why Is Britain Eurosceptic? (London: Centre for 
European Reform, 2008), http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/ 
archive/essay/2008/why-britain-eurosceptic. 
 It is easy to think of the problems 
the UK is seen to bring to the EU: its late arrival and 
reluctance to embrace membership; a political nar-
rative that is often particularistic; its obsession with 
sovereignty, often with a variety of meanings; its 
determination to maintain close relations with the 
US over Europe; its insular mentality meaning it 
struggles to identify itself as European; its refusal to 
join Schengen; its absence from the Euro and oppo-
sition to changes that touch on the City of London; 
its failure to push forward cooperation on foreign, 
security and defence matters; its willingness to say no, 
including increasingly to proposals from other mem-
ber states and not simply the Commission; its diffi-
culties with the EU budget and its rebate; its prefer-
ence for opt-outs on social and justice matters; its pick 
and mix attitude towards EU obligations; refusals to 
cooperate that have led the EU to work around it on 
issues such as the Euro or, in 1997, to put off conclud-
ing the Amsterdam Treaty until a new, and less Euro-
sceptic, British government was elected; the failure 
of successive British governments to live up to their 
often stated aim of cooperating with the EU, instead 
allowing a largely Eurosceptic agenda to dominate; its 
view of the EU as a means to an end for British inter-
ests, instead of a means to the end of European unity 
and cooperation. Rid of Britain the EU would not have 
to face episodes such as David Cameron’s veto at the 
December 2011 EU summit. Without Britain to block 
the way the EU could move forward more swiftly in 
building a political, economic and social union. 
Such an outlook overlooks wider weaknesses in the 
EU, some of which the UK has played its part in, but 
where blaming the UK can overplay its influence. Just 
as in the UK blaming the EU for Britain’s problems dis-
tracts from Britain’s home-grown problems, so too do 
any attempt to view the UK as the main obstacle over-
look the EU’s wider failings. 
There is a long recognised habit in the EU of mem-
ber states hiding their own objections to proposals 
behind Britain’s willingness to be the member who 
says no.58
 
58  Although as Roderick Parkes notes, this is becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain as more proposals emanate 
from the Council, and thus the member states, and not from 
the Commission. See Roderick Parkes, The British Questions: 
What Explains the EU’s New Angloscepticism?, SWP Comments 
11/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2010), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
comments/2010C11_kre_pks_ks.pdf. 
 Successive British governments have not 
refrained from pointing out how Britain has never 
failed to ratify an EU treaty, unlike several other states 
traditionally seen as more pro-European, such as 
France. Britain has a satisfactory record of implement-
ing EU law; a common complaint in the UK being 
that, in comparison to others, the UK is too willing to 
fulfil its obligations to implement EU laws, whether it 
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agreed with them or not.59 British membership of the 
EU has never been subject to moves to isolate it as a 
result of the success of far-right political groups.60 In 
backing the US over the Iraq War the UK was not alone 
in the EU, with the then governments (if not necessar-
ily the citizens) of sixteen of the current twenty seven 
member states, supporting the war in some way.61 For 
some of Britain’s critics its most destructive contribu-
tion has been the idea of “juste retour”, best encapsu-
lated in the British rebate. Whether or not Britain is to 
blame for this idea, we cannot doubt the EU has long 
faced, and will continue to face, awkward demands 
from its member states for juste retour.62
A British withdrawal raises a whole host of possi-
bilities about changes to the balance of power and 
leadership of the EU. A withdrawal could boost the 
Franco-German axis. This, however, ignores that both 
Paris and Berlin have often used London to balance 
the other, something London has often gone along 
with in the hope of turning the axis into a triangle. 
Even with other states such as Poland or Italy filling 
the UK’s place, we cannot overlook how the Franco-
German axis has struggled to provide leadership 
thanks to the widening of the EU. The Franco-German 
axis and the wider EU have also struggled to adapt to 
Germany’s increasingly dominant position. The dis-
appearance of a large state such as the UK, one often 
willing to use its weight to challenge EU thinking, 
could further embolden Germany’s position and 
agenda. 
 
That said, there are numerous other scenarios a 
British withdrawal could lead to, some of which could 
hurt Germany. The loss of the UK in an enlarged EU 
means that for western states such as France, the 
centre of European power could shift further east-
wards. For Germany and Northern Europeans the shift 
 
59  For figures on the application of EU law see the European 
Commission’s annual reports on national implementation 
of EU law: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/ 
infringements_annual_report_en.htm. 
60  “Austria’s Haider Affair Gave the EU an Emergency Brake,” 
EurActiv, January 13, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/ 
austria-haider-affair-gave-eu-emergency-brake/article-151443. 
61  Ian Traynor and Ian Black, “Eastern Europe Dismayed at 
Chirac Snub,” The Guardian, February 19, 2003, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/19/iraq.france. 
62  Sandor Richter, Facing the Monster “Juste Retour”. On the Net 
Financial Position of Member States vis-à-vis the EU Budget and a 
Proposal for Reform (Vienna: The Vienna Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/ 
reform2008/library/contributions/us/20080404_US_15_ 
summary_en.pdf. 
could head south. For both France and Germany the 
loss of a large state could shift power further towards 
the smaller member states. Germany and other 
northern European states worry the loss of Britain 
with its strongly liberal minded approach to trade and 
economics, could tip the EU towards protectionism.63
For those arguing Britain holds back the develop-
ment of a social Europe, a British withdrawal would 
not end the growing pressure on Europe’s social 
models coming from the economic growth of places 
such as Asia, or indeed closer to home such as from 
the lower labour costs in Eastern Europe. Nor should 
it be overlooked how the varying models of social 
provision across the EU make harmonisation in this 
area difficult with or without the UK. Britain already 
stands accused of trying to undercut the rest of the EU 
through exclusion from, or minimisation of, EU social 
and employment laws. For a large number of Euro-
sceptics such laws merely restrain Britain – and the EU 
– from competing.
 
For states which have secured opt-outs, such as Den-
mark and Sweden, the idea of differentiated integra-
tion or a multi-speed Europe could become more dif-
ficult to sustain. The absence of the largest supporter 
of such approaches would leave them exposed. A core-
Europe could put them under pressure to cede power 
and move towards uniformity. 
64 Such views have been critiqued, 
notably by how the same and sometimes more com-
prehensive social and employment laws don’t hold 
back other EU states who out-compete the UK inter-
nationally, while also achieving higher standards of 
living.65
As for the EU’s institutions, it is unlikely the UK’s 
withdrawal would do anything directly to boost the 
position of the European Commission. We can say the 
same for the European Parliament. While the UK does 
have one of the lowest voter turn-out rates for Euro-
pean Parliament elections, voter turnout across the 
EU is quite low and has been in steady decline. If 
 Nevertheless, outside the EU the UK could 
attempt to further undercut the EU. 
 
63  See Mats Persson, “Hey Berlin, This Is What an EU without 
Britain Would Look Like,” The Telegraph, 7 June 2013, 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/matspersson/100024783/
hey-berlin-this-is-what-an-eu-without-britain-would-look-like/. 
64  See Rennie, The Continent of the Open Sea? Does Britain Have a 
European Future? (see note 17), 35. 
65  Philip Whyte, Do Britain’s European Ties Damage Its Prosperity? 
(London: Centre for European Reform, 2013), 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachm
ents/pdf/2013/final_essay_obstacle_prosperity_22march13-
7144.pdf. 
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British voters are removed from the 2009 European 
Parliament elections, then voter turnout across the 
EU increases from 43.24 per cent to 44.39 per cent.66 
This would still have been the lowest voter turnout in 
the history of elections to the European Parliament.67
The EU’s institutions could be more affected by 
developments in the Euro zone. A British withdrawal 
could allow the EU’s institutions to be more directly 
involved in managing the Euro zone, eliminating the 
need for separate treaties or institutions.
 
Despite its significant powers and responsibilities, 
in many member states the Parliament is likely to 
remain a second-order election. Solving the EU’s demo-
cratic deficit, or creating a European demos would 
remain a significant challenge with or without the UK. 
68
Those hoping a British withdrawal could facilitate a 
solution to the crises facing the Euro must be careful 
not to overlook several problems. First, membership 
of the EU and Eurozone will still not align. A British 
withdrawal would mean the disappearance of the 
largest non-Euro member state. However, while in 
comparison to the UK they have so far been more co-
operative, the remaining non-Euro members of the EU 
could pose some problems for the EU’s institutions 
being used for the Eurozone.
 Britain’s 
absence from the December 2011 summit could have 
allowed the EU to move forward in such a way. Efforts 
could then more easily be made in moving forward 
the development of common policies, ranging from 
the Europeanisation of national debts, through to 
common taxation policies. Attempts within the EU 
to move towards such common policies have played 
a key part in pushing the UK towards a possible re-
negotiation and exit. Surely then, a British exit would 
make such changes possible, making it easier to bring 
stability to the Eurozone, and in turn, the EU? 
69
 
66  Calculations based on figures taken from House of 
Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2009, Research 
Paper 09/53 (June 2009), http://www.parliament.uk/ 
documents/commons/lib/research/rp2009/rp09-053.pdf. 
 Second, given the time-
67  For details of turnouts see the European Parliament’s 
own figures: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-
2009%29.html. 
68  Christoph Schult, “EU Divisions: Questioning the Legality 
of a Separate Euro Treaty,” Spiegel Online, December 9, 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-divisions-
questioning-the-legality-of-a-separate-euro-treaty-a-802678. 
html. 
69  The other non-members of the Eurozone are Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Sweden. 
scale of a withdrawal, steps to deal with the current 
crises will have to be taken with the UK as a member 
of the EU. Were the UK to vote to withdraw, the 
EU would still be faced with a member state able to 
exercise its powers and votes in all areas excepting 
those relating to its withdrawal and do so possibly 
until around 2019. Ways to get around British objec-
tions will still need to be found. A British withdrawal 
means the EU will not face such objections in future 
crises, but will continue to face them during the cur-
rent one, as was the case in December 2011. Third, 
depending on what post-withdrawal relationship was 
agreed, the EU could lose any direct influence over the 
operations of the City of London. Freed from the EU it 
could become a more loose and deregulated place 
than within the EU. That said, it is sometimes over-
looked how the UK has not been resistant to regulat-
ing financial markets, with the British Government 
today being less accommodating to the City than it 
used to be.70
Finally, whether in discussing steps to solve the 
Eurozone crisis, or when discussing the broader devel-
opment of the EU, the members of the EU and Euro-
zone will still divide between those who favour a 
more federal structure and those who want to pre-
serve sovereignty, between those favouring collective 
responsibility rather than solidarity.
 
71
Post-withdrawal Relations 
between the EU and UK 
 Hopes the EU 
will become easier to lead cannot overlook how the 
UK’s exclusion from several forums such as those con-
nected to the Euro, has meant British objections and 
means to delay have been limited. The Euro crisis itself 
has shown how with the UK out of the room, or ex-
cluded, the rest of the EU can still struggle to find 
leadership, solidarity and cohesion. 
Article 50 requires any withdrawal agreement with a 
member state takes into account, “the framework for 
its future relationship with the Union.” Both the UK 
and EU will be compelled by geography, economics – 
 
70  Philip Whyte, Britain Europe and the City of London: Can the 
Triangle Be Managed? (London: Centre for European Reform, 
2012), http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/essay/ 
2012/britain-europe-and-city-london-can-triangle-be-managed. 
71  Robin Niblett, The Future of the European Union: UK Govern-
ment Policy – Written Submissions to the House of Com-
mons Foreign Affairs Committee (June 2012), http://www. 
chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/184199. 
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indeed, by sheer realpolitik – to develop a working 
relationship for managing their common problems. It 
is clear that four options exist. Each poses a series of 
problems for the EU. 
The EU could negotiate a relationship with the 
UK akin to that which it has with Norway. The EU-
Norwegian relationship has been relatively smooth, 
in large part thanks to Norway’s political and policy 
compliance.72
The Swiss-EU relationship, within EFTA but not in 
the EEA, is one increasingly eyed as desirable by Brit-
ish Eurosceptics.
 As a result of its membership of the 
EEA, Norway has limited influence over the making of 
EU policy and laws, yet subjects itself to them. Norway 
therefore subjects itself to all EU laws relating to the 
single market, including areas such as the working 
time directive, a sensitive issue in the UK. Compliance 
is monitored by the Brussels based supranational EFTA 
Surveillance Authority and adjudicated on by the 
EFTA Court based in Luxembourg. Their work mirrors 
that undertaken by the European Commission and ECJ 
within the EU. It is unlikely the EU will find the UK 
will be as compliant and placid in its relations with 
the EU. 
73 It has been labelled as a free-trade 
model the UK could aim for.74 Switzerland was due to 
join Norway in the EEA at the same time, but in 1992 
the Swiss people narrowly rejected membership of the 
EEA. Switzerland is therefore under no obligation 
to accept new EU legislation, nor can it influence the 
development of that legislation. However, given its 
location and dependence on the European market, 
Switzerland often develops its laws with the EU in 
mind. To facilitate access to the EU’s internal market, 
the EU and Switzerland have drawn up a number of 
bilateral agreements covering a range of areas, but 
which are not comprehensive.75
 
72  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons 
for the UK (see note 
 For example, there is, 
52), 2. 
73  Daniel Hannan, “Switzerland Is a More Attractive Model 
Than Norway, But Britain Could Do Better Than Either,” The 
Telegraph Blog, December 15, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/danielhannan/100194407/outside-the-eu-we-should-
aim-to-copy-switzerland-not-norway/. 
74  Stephen Booth and Christopher Howarth, Trading Places: 
Is EU Membership Still the Best Option for UK Trade? (London: 
Open Europe, 2012) 35–40, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/ 
Content/Documents/2012EUTrade_new.pdf. 
75  In addition to the 1972 free trade agreement through 
EFTA, bilateral agreements so far agreed cover free movement 
of persons, civil aviation, overland transport, agriculture, 
technical barriers to trade, public procurement, scientific 
research, Schengen, fraud, education, statistics, environment, 
as yet, no agreement on financial services. Switzerland 
is also under no obligation to accept further EU legis-
lation implemented after these agreements come into 
force. From the perspective of the EU, Switzerland has 
increasingly cherry-picked agreements that benefit its 
national interest. Furthermore, unlike with Norway, 
there is no supranational oversight of the agreements, 
meaning disputes can go unresolved.76
If the UK were to follow either the Swiss or Nor-
wegian models, then it would be excluded from par-
ticipation in EU common policies such as agriculture, 
fisheries, foreign, security and defence, justice and 
immigration and the Euro. However, Norway, through 
the EEA, and Switzerland through a bilateral agree-
ment, have agreed to the free movement of persons, as 
is the case throughout the EU. Both have gone further 
by joining the Schengen Area. UK membership of the 
EEA would allow EU nationals to continue to move, 
work and live freely in the UK. The UK would also have 
to pay into the EU, but expect to receive only a limited 
return from the EU, mainly funding for scientific 
research programmes. 
 From the EU’s 
perspective the arrangement with Switzerland was 
never intended as a long-term model. As a result the 
EU has grown increasingly frustrated with its limi-
tations. It is therefore unlikely to be a relationship the 
EU would willingly agree to with the UK, because the 
size of the relationship would be far more complex, 
presenting bigger problems. 
Offering a Swiss or Norwegian relationship to the 
UK also runs the risk of continuing Britain’s difficult 
relationship with the EU, albeit one that is more iso-
lated from causing direct obstruction in formal deci-
sion making. Paying for membership of the EEA, 
allowing the free movement of people into the UK and 
being subjected to supranational oversight of EU legis-
lation – over all of which it would have no direct in-
fluence – is unlikely to be popular in a UK where a 
vote to leave would have secured the domination of 
Euroscepticism in British politics. Britain’s entry into 
EFTA and the EEA would also imbalance two organi-
sations which have increasingly become bilateral 
arrangements for Norwegian-EU and Swiss-EU rela-
tions. Relations with the UK would remain difficult, 
 
media, taxation of savings, pensions, Europol and Eurojust. 
Details of these agreements are available at the Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs: http://www.europa.admin.ch/ 
themen/00500/index.html?lang=en. 
76  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons for 
the UK (see note 52), 2. 
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and could become more complicated with Switzer-
land and Norway. 
The UK could adopt a relationship akin to that of 
Turkey, which enjoys a form of customs union with 
the EU.77 If the UK wanted more than this, then it 
could lead to changes in the relationship with Turkey, 
creating a new type of relationship between EU and 
non-EU states. As such the UK could negotiate an 
entirely new relationship, such as membership of the 
single market and some political cooperation on secu-
rity matters. The trade deficit in goods (it runs a trade 
surplus in services) the UK runs with the rest of the EU 
may lead some to argue the EU would be compelled to 
negotiate some form of special deal with the UK. This 
overlooks the mutual benefits for both the UK and 
EU of a very large trading relationship. For example, 
Switzerland runs a trade-deficit with the EU, but does 
not appear to gain any extra leverage as a result.78 
Furthermore, those making such an argument may be 
overlooking the strength of opposition to such a move. 
For example, many newer member states in eastern 
and central Europe may object to a member state 
withdrawing to a new relationship where it cherry-
picks its preferred parts of the EU, when they were 
recently compelled to accept the entire EU acquis as 
the price of their membership.79
Finally, the UK could adopt a position of a WTO 
member, with no special links to the EU, EFTA, EEA or 
through some form of new relationship or free trade 
agreement. This would be the relationship the UK 
would be forced into if it decided to withdraw uni-
laterally without negotiation, or fail to reach agree-
ment with the EU regarding a withdrawal agreement 
and framework for future relations. Even Eurosceptic 
groups admit such a move would be extremely damag-
ing for the UK economy.
 
80 For the EU, the economic 
shock would also hit it, although not in as large a way 
as the UK would feel it. In the long-run it would also 
mean 14.8 per cent of the current EU economy, along 
with the City of London, would be located outside any 
framework with the EU.81
 
77  Booth and Howarth, Trading Places: Is EU Membership Still the 
Best Option for UK Trade? (see note 
 
74), 41–44. 
78  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons for 
the UK (see note 52), 9. 
79  Ibid., 7. 
80  Booth and Howarth, Trading Places: Is EU Membership Still the 
Best Option for UK Trade? (see note 74), 45. 
81  Economic figure calculated from Eurostat figures for 2013 
GDP at current prices. UK economy is €1,940,659.6 billion 
Whatever relationship was chosen, there exists 
the possibility it would further complicate the maze 
of existing frameworks governing relations between 
European states. Here lies one of the bigger political 
problems of handling a British withdrawal: that other 
EU, and EU connected states such as Norway, deem the 
UK’s arrangements unfair and seek to emulate them. 
That said, some might also see weaknesses and prefer 
their own individually tailored relationship. 
The relationship would also not be one focused 
entirely on trade. The UK and EU could seek an inter-
governmental relationship, an EU+1, an EU2+1 involv-
ing France, Germany and the UK, or a modified G6, 
to discuss areas of mutual concern.82 Norway and 
Switzerland find their cooperation in Schengen to be 
satisfactory, because they are involved in discussions 
from the lowest working group up to ministerial 
level.83
Whatever relationship is adopted, it is foreseeable 
that the UK will expect to be treated in some special 
way. Cameron made clear that while he admired both 
Norway and Switzerland, he saw Britain as deserving 
more than the relationships they held with the EU. 
This, he hopes, will be within the EU.
 
84
Any expectation of special treatment also reflects 
the impact forty years of membership has had on the 
UK. It will not be possible for Britain to return to the 
status-quo that existed before it joined in 1973.
 But should 
the relationship be from the outside, it is likely the 
UK would expect more than to be grouped with Nor-
way and Switzerland. In part this reflects a high self-
opinion of Britain’s place in the world, although in 
part it also reflects the UK’s much larger demographic, 
economic and military size compared to Norway and 
Switzerland. 
85
 
of the EU’s €13,086,459.2 billion, http://appsso.eurostat.ec. 
europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c&lang=en. 
 
The EU and more broadly Europe has become a more 
integral part of British life. Removing itself from the 
formal structures of the EU will reduce Britain from 
a decision maker to decision taker. The UK may then 
find it faces the problems Norway and Switzerland 
have faced, where despite their long-running relation-
ships with the EU they have found it increasingly 
82  The G6 are Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, and since 
2006, Poland who meet to discuss internal security policy. 
83  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons 
for the UK (see note 52), 4. 
84  Cameron, “The Future of the EU and the UK’s Relationship 
with It” (see note 2). 
85  Miller, In Brief: Leaving the European Union (see note 45), 1. 
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difficult to make their voices heard in the prolifer-
ating number of EU agencies and institutions.86
Britain, whether as the government or some part of 
civil society, is more than likely to seek on-going rela-
tions with the EU thanks to the wide range of mutual 
concerns. As long as the EU remains Europe’s pre-
dominant political organisation the UK will seek to 
influence it. There are many areas of mutual con-
cern. In the high politics of security, issues such as 
Iran, Israel-Palestine and security of areas such as the 
Mediterranean will be regular topics of discussion. 
Despite the wide-ranging problems that afflict the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the UK, like the 
rest of the EU, has developed something of a reflex to 
try and work through the EU. Britain’s economic links 
means it will need to engage with EU efforts to ensure 
stability and competitiveness across Europe. Efforts 
to tackle crime and illegal immigration have already 
seen the UK involve itself formally in EU decision 
making on these areas through the G6, despite the 
UK securing various opt-outs in these areas.
 Never-
theless, the UK will more than likely put great effort 
into being a decision shaper, drawing on over forty 
years of direct experience within the EU. UKRep, 
renamed the UK Mission to the EU, would remain one 
of Britain’s most important diplomatic postings. The 
UK’s diplomatic network throughout the EU would 
continue to lobby individual member states. British 
political parties will remain connected to European 
political groupings, albeit reduced to associate status 
and unable to follow proceedings and influence 
amendments in the European Parliament as effec-
tively as they do now. Lobbying efforts whether from 
the British government, regional and local govern-
ments, political parties, business or from UK civil 
society groups now connected to European counter-
parts would decline, but are highly likely to be con-
siderably more comprehensive and influential than 
of any other non-EU state. 
87
Perhaps the biggest test for the EU will be in 
whether it can present a united front to the UK. 
Britain has a long-standing approach of bilateralism 
 Similar 
cooperation, in areas ranging from the environ-
ment through to food safety, could be facilitated. 
 
86  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons 
for the UK (see note 52), 4. 
87  Nicolai von Ondarza, Strengthening the Core or Splitting 
Europe?, SWP Research Paper 2/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, March 2013), 20–21, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/ fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/ 
2013_RP02_orz.pdf. 
in EU politics, one it has used to push EU policy and 
cooperation in a number of areas.88
The EU, Britain and the World 
 Given the UK 
would continue to have an interest in EU decision 
making, this approach would continue from the out-
side, with the UK seeking to advance its interests 
through a network of allies. While the ability of the 
UK to divide and rule should not be overplayed, it 
should not be underestimated either. The EU has 
struggled to act in a united way in dealings with a 
range of other non-EU states such as Russia, the USA, 
Turkey and Israel. To what extent then can we expect 
it to manage a united front to the UK? 
From the perspective of Asia or the Americas a British 
withdrawal may merely reinforce views of Europe as 
riven by division, introspection and decline. It would 
raise questions about the viability of replicating Euro-
pean integration elsewhere such as through Mercosur 
in South America or the African Union.89
The single biggest test may lie in the response of 
the US. Britain has long been guilty of overlooking the 
close relationships between the USA and other Euro-
pean states such as Germany. Equally, talk elsewhere 
in the EU of Britain as an American Trojan horse 
merely reinforces Britain’s perception of itself as 
America’s only European ally. As noted earlier, Britain 
is part of a majority of current EU member states 
whose governments in 2003 showed support to the US 
over the Iraq War. Britain’s withdrawal would soon 
see any number of applicants to fill its place of trying 
 Major pow-
ers may seek to exploit such divisions. Of course, this 
depends to some extent, on whether the rest of the EU 
is able to move forward in creating a united approach, 
not only towards the UK, but to the rest of the world. 
Questions will, however, persist about “who speaks for 
Europe” if the UK and other non-EU European states 
disagree with the EU. This would all take place against 
a backdrop of a Europe in relative decline. A British 
withdrawal would further this decline, while also 
doing little to help the UK’s own position. 
 
88  For an account of the UK’s approach to bilateralism see 
Julie Smith and Mariana Tsatsas, The New Bilateralism: The UK’s 
Bilateral Relations within the EU (London, Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 2002). 
89  Kate Connolly et al., “Reaction to Cameron’s EU Speech: 
‘A Politics of Cherry-picking Will Not Work,’” The Guardian, 
January 23, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/ 
jan/23/david-cameron-europe-international-reaction. 
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to be America’s closest ally within the EU. The bigger 
misunderstanding here, however, might be an over-
estimation, by the EU and UK, of US willingness to 
take as close an interest in Europe, the EU and the UK 
(with or without the UK in the EU) as it did in the past. 
This does not mean the US is going to give up on 
Europe, cease being a major European power, or stop 
seeking the support of allies it shares many ideals 
with and who, despite significant weaknesses, retain 
some of the best equipped militaries in the world. 
Attempts at a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area have 
provided a reminder of the extremely close economic 
and political relationship. While the US and the EU 
have been rivals in trade, wider cooperation between 
them could benefit Western power in the face of the 
rise of other powers.90
Britain would remain a leading member of the 
other organisation which brings together most of 
Europe: NATO. Some British Eurosceptics believe a UK 
withdrawal from the EU would strengthen NATO by 
focusing European defence cooperation on it, so end-
ing EU attempts to work together in this area.
 But the USA’s current weariness 
about Europe reflects over twenty years of growing 
frustrations – often exasperation – at the repeated 
inability of the Europeans to wield power effectively in 
the global arena, or work together effectively to boost 
this in defence. A British withdrawal may further 
complicate such long-struggling efforts, dampening 
further US hopes and interest. 
91
 
90  Charles A. Kupchan, “Albion at the EU Exit Door,” The New 
York Times, November 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/ 1/20/opinion/albion-at-the-eu-exit-door.html?_r=1& 
adxnnl=1&ref=global&adxnnlx=1353336894-NKrke6Agqv 
BZOqAibBy6OQ&. 
 The 
UK’s withdrawal, however, could easily further com-
plicate NATO’s future through posing problems for 
wider European defence and security cooperation. 
First, a British withdrawal would not end the pres-
sures on Europe – whether through the EU, or 
through the European side of NATO – to improve 
cooperation on defence. British Eurosceptic hopes 
it would do so lack any strategy for what would 
happen after a withdrawal, the expectation being 
the EU and EU member states would have to defer to 
NATO. Nor would it end the security pressures facing 
Europe as a whole, whether these are traditional hard 
power threats or softer security risks. It is the latter, 
including security risks covering crime, the environ-
91  Geoffrey van Orden, “The EU’s CDSP Is a Misguided 
Irrelevance and Should Be Scrapped,” European Security and 
Defence Union, June 2012. 
ment and development which the EU is, arguably, 
better equipped to handle than NATO. Indeed, the 
UK has actively engaged with the EU in these areas.92 
Britain’s absence from the EU could make cooper-
ation between NATO and the EU more difficult than 
it already is. A British withdrawal would not end EU 
efforts – or hopes – at defence cooperation. Indeed, 
Britain’s involvement in defence cooperation might 
have limited how far it could proceed.93 It could 
therefore prompt renewed efforts by France, Germany 
and others to push ahead in EU defence cooperation. 
However, such efforts in the past have made little 
progress because of Britain’s absence. It is also worth 
remembering it is not just the UK that poses problems 
in this area. Attempts at progress on the EU’s Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy has been limited by 
Germany’s continued unease at contemplating the use 
of military force and willingness to surrender national 
autonomy over such a politically and historically sen-
sitive area. This is despite a stated desire by German 
governments to see progress in this area.94 Such 
problems helped drive both the UK and France into 
reaching an agreement to work together bilaterally, 
rather than with Germany or through the EU.95
Britain’s unease at EU defence cooperation reflects 
a long-running desire to maintain an ability to work 
independently with the US. As noted earlier, it is often 
overlooked that one aim of this is to ensure the US 
remains interested in, and willing to provide, Euro-
pean security. Defence cuts in the UK have made this 
choice more difficult, but the UK has appeared deter-
mined to try and continue to seek influence over the 
US through a military offering. Withdrawal from the 
EU might undermine the UK’s strategy. A divided EU, 
weakened European efforts at defence cooperation, 
a struggling EU-NATO relationship and continued 
pressures on the UK defence budget mean the UK 
 
 
92  See evidence submitted to the UK’s Joint Committee on 
the National Security Strategy, The National Security Strategy 
Third Review, Written Evidence, April 25, 2013, http://www. 
parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/national-security-
strategy/NSS%20Third%20Review/collatedevidence3rdrev.pdf. 
93  Sven Biscop, “The UK and European Defence: Leading or 
Leaving?,” International Affairs 88, no. 6 (2012): 1297–1313. 
94  Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, “The UK, the EU and 
European Security: a German Perspective,” The RUSI Journal 
158, no. 4 (2013): 32–36. 
95  Ben Jones, Franco-British Military Cooperation: A New Engine for 
European Defence?, Occasional Paper 88 (Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2011), http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
uploads/media/op88--Franco-British_military_cooperation--
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could find it has helped to undermine the wider 
European pillar on which rests a great deal of British 
power, including influence in Washington D.C. 
Any efforts by the rest of the EU to maintain rela-
tions with a non-EU UK on defence matters are likely 
to receive a positive response given the UK’s long-
standing attempts to use the EU as a means of up-
holding its aspirations to play a global role especially 
in military matters. As a European state, Britain has 
long drawn on the position of its home continent in 
world affairs. From the outside the UK is likely to seek 
ways to utilise its links with the EU as a means to an 
end of achieving British national interests. The EU will 
find Britain likely to continue seeing a network of 
relations in Europe – whether through NATO, other 
organisations such as the OSCE or the Council of 
Europe, strong bilateral relations with other European 
states and a close relationship with the EU – as one of 
the foundations of its power. Given the poor outlook 
on European defence, and the likely need for further 
cooperation, in this area the EU will find it difficult 
to avoid a relationship of some sort with the UK.96
An alternative approach to 
European Cooperation? 
 
Agreeing to a new relationship with the UK in or 
outside the EU could create an alternative to the 
standard direction of European integration and co-
operation. If the UK were to adopt a relationship 
similar to that of Norway or Switzerland then those 
existing alternatives could be strengthened. For critics 
of Britain’s tactics this, along with its attempt at a 
renegotiated relationship, is nothing short of black-
mailing the rest of the EU into accepting demands 
for itself and for the direction of the EU. 
While this approach can be criticised, we should 
not overlook how it is not just British Eurosceptics 
who question what they see as the centralising 
panacea of European integration. A range of Euroscep-
tics and pro-Europeans, both in the UK and through-
out the EU, would agree in a broad way that the EU is 
headed in the wrong direction. It is possible that cam-
paigners from both sides would use a UK renegotia-
 
96  Christian Moelling, Europe without Defence, SWP Comments 
38/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Novem-
ber 2011), http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-
research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/europa_ 
ohne_verteidigung.html. 
tion or a withdrawal as a means to challenge the direc-
tion of European integration. 
Cameron’s commitment to giving the British 
people a referendum has helped push calls for similar 
referendums elsewhere in the EU, for example calls in 
the Netherlands.97 If Britain were to succeed in nego-
tiating for itself a new relationship, which was then 
backed by the British people, some politicians else-
where in the EU may argue Britain’s relationship with 
the EU would command more democratic support 
than that of other member states whose populations 
had been denied a similar say. Any such arguments 
would aim to tap into growing public unease through-
out the EU over the direction of European integra-
tion.98
While other in-out referendums are unlikely, there 
exists the potential the UK’s approach will add to 
the inevitable calls in other member states for refer-
endums on any new treaty or changes to the EU and 
Eurozone negotiated around the same time as any 
British renegotiation and referendum. When previous 
treaties, in particular the European Constitution, have 
been subject to ratification through referendum there 
have been suggestions that any member state that 
fails to ratify should consider withdrawal, be expelled 
or placed into an associate status membership.
 
99
A British withdrawal also holds the potential to 
change relations between the EU and non-EU Euro-
pean states, mainly Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and 
Turkey. It could also have implications for the rela-
tionships the EU is trying to broker with Ukraine and 
Belarus. As noted earlier, current arrangements lack 
 With 
the prospect of a British withdrawal overshadowing 
any such referendums such talk could become more 
realistic than it has in the past. Against the backdrop 
of any such widespread calls for referendums, any talk 
or opposition to states holding referendums could end 
up serving those who argue the EU lacks legitimacy, 
intent as it might appear to make decisions about the 
future of the EU in a centralised, top-down way. 
 
97  Matt Steinglass, “Dutch Support for EU Referendum,” 
The Financial Times, March 3, 2016, http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/6e676a5c-867b-11e2-b907-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz2UcWPYXyi. 
98  Jose Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard, The Conti-
nent Wide Rise of Euroscepticism (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2013), http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_ 
EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
99  See Charles Grant, What if Britain Says No? (London: 
Centre for European Reform, 2004), http://www.cer.org.uk/ 
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uniformity with frustrations on all sides. For the 
EU individual arrangements with Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland and Turkey were intended, in differing 
ways, as transmission belts leading to full EU mem-
bership. A British withdrawal could put any trans-
mission belt into reverse. Alternatively, a well-
managed outer-tier of the EU – perhaps something 
akin to a “Single Market Club” – could appeal to 
them.100
Of course a great deal hangs on what type of rela-
tionship the UK and EU developed and whether both 
sides were prepared to share any new relationship 
with other states. This also assumes other states such 
as Norway would abandon their own individual 
tailored relationships with the EU. Such details aside, 
these states would now find themselves part of a 
larger grouping than they were in the past. 
 
For Turkey a UK withdrawal would mean the loss 
of one of its strongest supporters of membership. 
Any remaining support in the EU would be further 
dampened by fears Turkish membership would 
unsettle an already changed balance of power in an 
EU post-UK withdrawal. Britain’s move to the outside 
of the EU may provide the opportunity for the EU to 
seek an alternative relationship with Turkey, bringing 
to an end any hopes of membership. 
 
 
 
100  Buchan, Outsiders on the Inside: Swiss and Norwegian Lessons 
for the UK (see note 52), 10–11. 
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Conclusions 
 
That the possibility of the UK leaving the EU in the 
near future is now more real than ever before should 
not make us assume it will happen. A move to with-
draw is dependent on a myriad of factors, such as the 
outcome of any attempt at a renegotiated relationship 
within the EU, the composition of the British govern-
ment elected in 2015, the outcome of changes to the 
Eurozone, economic and political moods, and last 
but not least, the opinion of the British people when 
tested in a referendum. Nevertheless, the possibility 
has become more real and if there is to be a renegotia-
tion and referendum, then the issue of withdrawal 
would need to be discussed by both sides. Discussing 
withdrawal during any renegotiation may allow the 
EU and UK to better manage the outcome of a refer-
endum vote supporting withdrawal. Indeed, David 
Cameron’s hopes – like the hopes of any British 
government of whatever political composition – to 
secure a renegotiation within the EU, rests in part on 
the threat a British withdrawal could damage the EU. 
Shying away from discussing the implications of a 
British withdrawal only serves those who seek it, those 
who benefit from the unknowns surrounding such a 
decision and those who hope such a move will inflict 
damage on the rest of the EU. While there has been 
some discussion of the effect of the UK renegotiating 
its relationship within the EU, the effects of a UK 
withdrawal, which could have an equally large im-
pact, have been largely overlooked. While the aim of 
the EU is likely to be to retain the UK as a member 
state – a position this author supports – only through 
pro-active discussion of all options can this be 
achieved, or the damage of a withdrawal be limited. 
If the UK, as Labour leader Ed Miliband warned, is 
sleepwalking towards the EU exit, then the EU should 
not itself be asleep to what this could mean for the EU. 
A vote to withdraw would likely have far more 
significant implications for Britain than the EU. But 
the rest of the EU would also have to deal with the 
departure of one of its largest and most significant 
member states. Britain’s political relationship with 
the EU has often been a fraught one, unease at the 
idea of such aims as “ever closer union” going back to 
before the UK’s membership and to the very start of 
European integration. At the same time the UK has 
contributed much to the EU, its absence from the EU 
would be palpable, and its awkwardness should not 
be overplayed to the point where it can be blamed for 
wider systemic problems in the EU. 
A UK withdrawal could open a Pandora’s Box of 
problems for the EU. These problems can be divided 
into three inter-related groups. First, how to manage 
a process of withdrawal, something untested and 
shrouded in uncertainty. Second, how to manage the 
implications for the operation of the remaining EU 
and to wider European integration and cooperation. 
Third, what relationship to seek with a UK which will 
remain a significant if somewhat reduced European 
power. 
As this paper has explored, the process by which a 
member state withdraws – what we have here called 
the divorce process – is an uncertain one. While 
Article 50 TEU provides more guidance than existed 
in the past, it is untested and subject to a range of 
doubts. Questions would arise as to how to implement 
Article 50 and how to change the EU’s institutions, 
budgets and modus operandi to reflect the departure 
of one of its largest member states. Negotiations 
would cover a wide range of both practical matters 
and political relations. A great deal of this would hang 
on what is agreed for a post-withdrawal relationship. 
Article 50 contains a series of possible complications, 
such as how the UK would be denied involvement 
in European Council and Council of Ministers dis-
cussions relating to its withdrawal, but meanwhile it 
could continue to exercise all other powers and rights 
within EU decision making. Putting Article 50 to the 
test would also set precedents, possibly aiding future 
withdrawals and developing further the idea of 
expelling a member state. 
The timescale of a British withdrawal would be 
unclear, dependent as it would be on a large number 
of factors in both the EU and UK. A British referendum 
in 2017 backing withdrawal would then lead to a two 
year period of negotiations, putting a British with-
drawal around 2019, possibly longer if an extension 
were agreed. Depending on the post-withdrawal rela-
tionship agreed between the UK and the EU, there 
exists the possibility the UK could continue some 
formal involvement. While it may seem logical to 
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sideline the UK in advance of a withdrawal, such 
efforts would need to last for several years. They could 
easily create animosity on both sides, weakening the 
prospects of a positive post-withdrawal UK-EU rela-
tionship. 
While the timescale of managing a British with-
drawal – or divorce – might be longer than some 
think, negotiations both with the UK and within the 
EU will grapple with much longer-term implications 
for the operation of the EU and European politics. 
The UK’s absence from the decision making of the EU 
would add to ongoing changes to deal with the Euro 
crisis. It would therefore add to the change in the 
balance of power within the EU, adding to changes in 
the direction of European integration. Two questions 
overhang these changes. First, could the EU become 
easier to lead? And who and what ideas could benefit 
from a UK withdrawal and where would this take the 
EU? 
Numerous scenarios exist to answer both these 
questions. Some point towards a more inward looking 
EU, others to an EU where the balance of power has 
shifted further eastwards and towards smaller mem-
ber states. Alternatively, the Franco-German axis could 
be strengthened, but it could also be further weakened 
or further imbalanced to the benefit of Germany. Dif-
ferentiated integration could become more difficult, 
with uniformity and centralization made easier by the 
absence of the strongest opposition to such moves. The 
creation of a social Europe would still struggle with 
international pressures. The challenge of a democratic 
deficit and the need to develop a European demos 
would remain very much live issues within an EU with 
or without the UK. 
Whether the UK’s withdrawal would make the EU 
easier to lead is open to debate. While Britain has cer-
tainly been an awkward partner, any awkwardness 
should not lead us to ignore wider problems in the EU. 
As an example of this we can look to the problems 
with the Eurozone. A British withdrawal implemented 
between 2017 and 2019 would not help solve the 
immediate problem with the Eurozone; only make 
easier the necessary steps to deal with future prob-
lems. The eventual removal of the UK from the EU’s 
decision making structures would end any possibility 
of UK vetoes. However, current efforts to solve the 
Eurozone crisis have shown the EU can lack the neces-
sary solidarity and leadership in an area the UK is 
largely excluded from. The EU and members of the 
Eurozone would still divide between those who favour 
a more federal structure and those who want to pre-
serve sovereignty, between those favouring collective 
responsibility and those who want to preserve sover-
eignty. Overcoming such divisions could be made 
easier by a British withdrawal, but we should not 
think a British withdrawal can make this happen 
by itself. 
The EU would also need to reach agreement with 
the UK as to what relationship it would adopt with 
the EU from the outside. Both the EU and UK would 
need to come to terms with the ongoing relevance 
each would have for the other. For the EU, Britain 
would remain a European power if not an EU-power. 
For Britain, the EU as a collective relationship would 
remain its single most important one, more wide-
ranging than that with the US. Europe, whether 
through NATO or relations with the EU, is likely to 
remain a means to an end for British power and secu-
rity. In negotiating a post-withdrawal relationship the 
EU faces several options, each with pros and cons. 
The EU could agree to the UK adopting a relationship 
similar to either Norway or Switzerland. It could agree 
to a customs union similar to that with Turkey. Or the 
UK could take up the relationship of a WTO member 
with no special arrangements with the EU. Failure to 
reach agreement on a withdrawal would lead to the 
latter. Each of these has implications for the integra-
tion of the EU and wider European cooperation. They 
could change relations with European states not part 
of the EU, putting to an end hopes of their member-
ship of the EU. Other states within the EU may seek 
to follow the UK, leading to the unraveling of the EU. 
While the later may be unlikely, the UK’s decision – 
having been the result of a democratic referendum – 
could lead to increased questioning of the direction 
of European integration. A great deal depends on how 
the UK found life outside the EU and whether the 
Eurozone can solve its problems. If the UK struggled 
while the Eurozone stabilized and grew then the UK’s 
appeal would be diminished. If the Euro continues to 
struggle then the UK’s decision could start to look like 
a sensible move. More likely both the UK and the EU 
would continue to face significant difficulties whether 
the UK is in or outside the EU. 
The EU would also face the problem of how to 
relate to a UK which, while it would have moved from 
a decision maker to decision taker, would put great 
effort into being a decision shaper, given it would still 
have considerable interests in the EU. Both the UK and 
EU would need to continue working together over 
issues of mutual interest, not least of which is the 
security and prosperity of the whole of Europe. The 
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impact of a British withdrawal on the EU’s geo-
political standing also needs to be taken into account. 
Britain is both an obstacle to and integral to the suc-
cess of efforts to create a CFSP and ESDP. 
As should be clear, the potential implications for 
the EU of a UK withdrawal are unclear and open to 
much speculation. This is thanks in part to a lack of 
discussion of the topic. Indeed, the very idea of dis-
cussing a member state withdrawing from the EU 
remains a taboo subject. This remains the case despite 
the inclusion of Article 50 TEU and the growing pos-
sibility of a British withdrawal. This taboo should be 
broken. Shying away from discussing it only adds to 
uncertainty which those seeking the UK’s withdrawal 
benefit from. More importantly, if the EU is to reach 
a calculated decision about whether or not to press 
ahead with a renegotiation then it needs to assess 
whether or not it is worth making the effort to keep 
the UK inside on renegotiated terms, or whether it 
might be better to seek a new arrangement altogether 
with the UK on the outside. 
The possibility then of a UK withdrawal presents 
the EU with a series of questions: 
 1. Should the EU refuse to discuss the idea of a Brit-
ish withdrawal until a vote to withdraw actually 
happens? 
 2. Should the issue of withdrawal be discussed as 
part of any renegotiation of Britain’s relationship 
inside the EU? 
 3. What red-lines should the EU set down for any dis-
cussion of withdrawal, either in any renegotiation 
or during a withdrawal negotiation? 
 4. How is Britain’s part in European integration – 
both positive and negative – to be assessed? 
 5. To what extent would a UK withdrawal help solve 
the problems with the Eurozone and make possi-
ble further progress towards “ever closer union”? 
 6. What would a UK withdrawal mean for the EU’s 
international standing and security? 
 7. What type of relationship would the EU like to 
have with a UK that has left the EU, and how 
would this fit with, or change, the EU’s relation-
ships with other non-EU parts of Europe? 
 8. Should further written clarification be prepared 
about Article 50 TEU, and if so who is to do this? 
 9. What processes should the EU follow to manage 
the internal changes to the EU brought about by 
a UK withdrawal? 
 10. How would a UK withdrawal shift the balance of 
power in the EU and direction of European inte-
gration? 
Initial answers to these questions should point to 
how neither the UK nor EU should savor the idea of a 
British withdrawal. It could be traumatic for both the 
UK and the EU. This could be especially so for the UK, 
as it would mean withdrawing from its most impor-
tant and comprehensive international relationship. 
The EU, however, should be under no illusions that 
the impact on it could also be significant. 
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Appendix 
 
Acronyms 
CFSP Commons Foreign and Security Policy 
EEA European Economic Area 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
G6 Groups of 6 EU member states 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MP Member of Parliament (British House of Commons) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
QMV Qualified Majority Vote 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
WTO World Trade Organization 
Article 50 Treaty on European Union 
1.  Any Member State may decide to withdraw from 
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements. 
 
2.  A Member State which decides to withdraw shall 
notify the European Council of its intention. In the 
light of the guidelines provided by the European 
Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrange-
ments for its withdrawal, taking account of the frame-
work for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with 
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the 
Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parlia-
ment. 
 
3.  The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in 
question from the date of entry into force of the with-
drawal agreement or, failing that, two years after 
the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the Member 
State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this 
period. 
 
4.  For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the mem-
ber of the European Council or of the Council repre-
senting the withdrawing Member State shall not par-
ticipate in the discussions of the European Council or 
Council or in decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance 
with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
 
5.  If a State which has withdrawn from the Union 
asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the pro-
cedure referred to in Article 49. 
